Introduction
In the handful papers that consider the Russian …nancial market at the aggregate level (e.g., Gelos and Sahay, 2001; Jithendranathan and Kravchenko, 2002; Lucey and Voronkova, 2004; Hayo and Kutan, 2005) , it is generally presumed that, apart from the period of the Russian …nancial crisis of 1998 and possibly a few other crises, relationships in the market have been temporally stable. At the same time, it is documented that relationships in developing …nancial markets, particularly those in post-communist countries, have evolved di¤erently (e.g. Zalewska-Mitura and Hall, 1999; Rockinger and Urga, 2000) .
In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation of three aspects of the Russian stock market at the aggregate level over the past ten years. First, we study how various macroeconomic and …nancial variables, both global and domestic, have impacted Russian stock returns and how this impact has changed over time. We specially construct a variable to re ‡ect the political riskiness or attractiveness of the Russian stock market. Second, we track indicators of integration of the Russian stock market with world …nancial markets.
Third, we take a look at its e¢ ciency and the pro…tability of trading by a virtual investor.
To accomplish these goals, we compute various statistics of interest within a window of one year of data, with this window moving in time from early 1995 to late 2004-early 2005.
The …gures showing how the statistics of interest vary across time provide an interesting picture of the development of the stock market in Russia. We …nd tracking the statistics of interest over time in this manner is better suited to the constantly changing environment of a developing …nancial market than the popular methodology of identifying structural breaks at unknown dates developed by Bai and Perron (1998) , which is often applied to developed markets (e.g. Rapach and Wohar, 2004) .
In our analysis, we strive to use the simplest parametric models (and even nonparametric methods), because, in our view, the strong assumptions underlying, say, the ARCH models used in Rockinger and Urga (2000) and Hayo and Kutan (2005) , do not necessarily hold in a constantly changing environment. Moreover, our modest sample sizes preclude reliable inference of complicated parametric models. For the particular study of how stock returns have been determined, we use a linear regression analysis.
To see how the degree of market integration evolved over the period, we construct nonpara-3 metric "realized correlation"measures of co-movements from high-frequency (daily) returns data.
Finally, to study the question of e¢ ciency of the Russian stock market, we employ a nonparametric test of mean predictability, and look at the pro…tability of trading by a virtual investor.
The results yield substantial evidence that the Russian stock market has been a-icted by considerable structural instability, and that this instability has not been con…ned to one-time events such as the documented …nancial crises. Moreover, the in ‡uence of certain factors on Russian stock returns such as oil prices and foreign exchange rates has diminished, while the in ‡uence of other factors such as US stock prices and international and domestic interest rates has increased recently. The explanatory power of domestic and global factors has ‡uctuated appreciably, with the regression R 2 taking values from mere few percent to as much as 60%. There is no clear positive trend in the degree of integration of the Russian stock market with other stock markets, but in recent years the spillovers coming from other stock markets to the Russian market have increased, while spillovers in the opposite direction having diminished. The co-movements of Russian and world sectoral stock markets also exhibit a varying pattern. They are quite high most of the time, although not necessarily greater for energy markets. The weak-form market e¢ ciency of the Russian stock market is con…rmed, and the trading of a virtual investor using publicly observable information is not particularly pro…table, even under the assumption of no market limitations and during the periods of strong pro…tability in 1998 and 1999.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the data. In section 3, we conduct the analysis of factors in ‡uencing Russian stock returns, and the evolution of their impact through the years.
In section 4, we analyze the evolution of correlations between stock returns in the Russian and other international markets. In section 5, we track the e¢ ciency and pro…tability of Russian stock returns. Section 6 concludes.
Data
Ostrovsky (2003) and section 3 of Lucey and Voronkova (2004) Lucey and Voronkova (2004) . This index is available from January 2, 1995, when it had an initial value of 100. MSCI index dynamics are shown in Figure 1 . We call this variable msci ru : The MSCI index o¤ers two advantages: it has the Wednesday data that we use for weekly observations and conforms with the regional and sectoral MSCI indexes.
Along with msci ru ; the following data are used in further sections of the paper. In studying the determination of Russian stock returns, we employ:
oil -Brent crude oil price (in USD prices);
er -ruble/USD o¢ cial exchange rate (in rubles per USD); msci us -MSCI index for USA (in USD prices);
tbill -3-month US Treasury bills rate (in percent);
mibor -1-month Moscow interbank o¤er rate (in percent);
gold -gold reserves kept by the Central Bank of Russia (in USD million);
money -credit balances of correspondent accounts in the Central Bank of Russia (in billions of rubles).
In addition, we use the following volatility indexes: Figure 2 . Even though this variable is quite persistent and does not seem strictly stationary, it apparently no longer contains stochastic trends.
By construction, the sample average of risk is zero, so that the periods of positive and negative values of risk can be treated as periods of higher and lower levels of risk than We run rolling regressions with a moving window of 52 observations corresponding to one year. We do this for two data spans. The …rst period covers ten years from January 1995 to January 2005. The second period covers a bit more than …ve years from October 1999
to January 2005. More local-factor data is available for the latter period. For this shorter period, we also supplement the set of regressors by volatility variables. We use conventional (non-robust) standard errors, despite slight serial correlation in the residuals (as evidenced by small departures of the Durbin-Watson statistics from 2) because it is documented that their simplicity may actually hold an advantage over robust standard errors in small samples (Mishkin, 1990) . Of course, we do not take the standard errors at face value as the actual level of testing for signi…cance of coe¢ cients under sequential testing di¤ers from that under one-shot testing. Still, the standard error bands are informative; for example, they may be used as indicators of estimation uncertainty.
For the longer time interval, the dependent variable is ln(msci ru ); the independent variables, apart from a constant, are local instruments ln(er 1 ) and risk 1 ; and global factors ln(oil); ln(msci us ); and tbill: The exchange rate and risk are lagged (one week)
to avoid the simultaneity e¤ect, while global factors are taken with a lag of one day, since the US markets operate when Russia's domestic markets are already closed. Otherwise, global factors are presumed exogenous. The evolution of regression coe¢ cients together with 5%
(pointwise) con…dence bands are presented in Figure 3 , and the evolution of the regression R 2 is depicted in Figure 4 .
The top left panel in Figure 3 shows the evolution of in ‡uence of growth in oil prices.
This in ‡uence was found signi…cantly positive in Hayo and Kutan (2005) . The explanation is simple: increases in oil prices raise revenues and hence investment, both into the capitalization of oil companies and the stock market. Most of the time this e¤ect is found to be positive. The exceptions are the "puberty" period of 1995 and the period preceding 1998 crisis, when the market operated in a speculative mood. When positive, the elasticity is rather small despite the large share of oil extracting companies -possibly because oil export earnings were moved to a¢ liated companies for the purpose of tax minimization in a greater degree than they were invested. Interestingly, the con…dence band tends to shrink 8 as time passes. making it easier to pin down this in ‡uence. The top right panel in Figure 3 shows the evolution of in ‡uence of exchange rate depreciation. There is a distinct period of relatively large negative in ‡uence before the window takes on observations after the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) has announced it will pursue gradual devaluation of the ruble. Once the window includes the crisis observations, the in ‡uence of exchange rate depreciation goes completely ‡at (with a slight non-zero in ‡uence after 1999).
An interesting pattern unfolds in the two middle panels that present the evolution of in ‡uence of indicators from two US …nancial markets -stock and credit. The positive and signi…cant in ‡uence of the US stock market is apparent and con…rms previous …ndings on the integration of Russian and US stock markets (e.g., Jithendranathan and Kravchenko, 2002; Hayo and Kutan, 2005) . The degree of integration, however, is not constant. There is a At the same time, dependence on US interest rates is less pronounced, varying from negative to positive and back throughout the entire period. Recently, however, it has taken on large and signi…cant negative values.
Finally, the evolution of in ‡uence of risk/attractiveness factors is depicted in the bottom panel. This in ‡uence turns out to be strong, negative, and very volatile throughout, except for the pre-crisis and crisis periods when is was non-trivially positive, presumably because of a highly speculative mood in the market during turbulent times.
In Figure 4 , the evolution of the regression R 2 is depicted. The explanatory power of the regression varies considerably, from a few percent in 1996 and 2003 to nearly 50% in 1997, 2000-2001, and 2004 . The initial noisy behavior of the Russian stock market in 1996 can be explained by uncertainty over the outcome of the presidential elections. Regression R 2 has much less explanation power during the 2000 presidential elections as the outcome was much more predictable. The most stable periods of the Russian economy (1997, 2001-2002, and 2004) , are marked with a very high predictability of returns. Market preformance in 2004 also re ‡ects increased dependence on world …nancial markets.
The high variability of the estimated coe¢ cients clearly suggests instability. An important conclusion from this is that regressions on long time intervals may lead to spurious …ndings of causality for some factors, and conversely, to seeming insigni…cance of factors that were sources of signi…cant in ‡uence during some periods. This may be a reason, in addition to the omitted variables bias, that e.g. Hayo and Kutan (2005) did not …nd their news variables signi…cant. To illustrate, we run a one-shot regression using the data from the whole sample.
This regression yields the following results: with R 2 = 8%: The overall regression R 2 conceals much higher predictability during certain periods. As far as the coe¢ cient signi…cance is concerned, only ln(msci us ) turns out to be signi…cant at the 5% level. The robustness analysis in Hayo and Kutan (2005) , surprisingly, does not though lead to conclusions about structural instability.
For the shorter time interval, we add several instruments. The additional local instruments are vol er 1 ; mibor 1 ; ln(gold 1 ) and ln(money 1 ); and the additional global factors are vol oil and vol us : The evolution of regression coe¢ cients together with 5% (pointwise)
con…dence bands are presented in Figure 5 , and the evolution of the regression R 2 is depicted in Figure 6 .
The upper two panels of Figure The fourth pair of panels tracks the in ‡uence of US and Russian short-term interest rates.
It is clear that the in ‡uence of neither encompasses the in ‡uence of the other: sometimes only one has an e¤ect, sometimes both, sometimes neither. The in ‡uence is largely negative and consistent with evidence in developed stock markets (e.g., Rapach and Wohar, 2004) , except for few episodes where they were positive. Recent years have witnessed a sharp rise in the degree of in ‡uence of both international and domestic credit markets.
The …fth pair of panels shows how the money market in Russia in ‡uences the stock market, speci…cally the CBR's gold reserves and credit balances, i.e. money that domestic banks keep at correspondent accounts with the CBR that could otherwise be invested in the stock market. Both variables exerted both positive and negative in ‡uences on the stock market until mid-2002. Thereafter, the in ‡uence of both variables has been essentially zero.
Finally, the in ‡uence of risk factors depicted in the bottom panel is negative (although quite variable) throughout the last …ve years. The evolution of the regression R 2 shown on Figure 6 is also quite variable, and recently reached nearly 60%.
From the above analysis, one can infer slow progress toward the integration of the Russian and international stock markets: domestic factors playing a gradually diminishing role, while the importance of international factors has been increasing. In the next section we explicitly consider measures of integration and verify this conjecture.
Integration with other markets
In this section, we systematically analyze the integration between Russian stock returns and international equity markets, both regional and sectoral. Regional markets include the developed markets of the US, the World (except the US), Europe, the Paci…c region, as well as emerging markets in Latin America and Asia (Table 1 contains detailed information on the composition of MSCI regional indexes). The sectoral markets considered are the energy market, the market for materials, the market for capital goods, and the IT and telecommunications industries (Table 2 contains The degree of integration is usually judged by co-movements in stock prices or returns.
A variety of methods have been applied in the literature, including regression-based analysis (e.g. Gelos and Sahay, 2001; Jithendranathan and Kravchenko, 2002) , factor models (e.g. Dungey, Fry, González-Hermosillo, and Martin, 2003) , and cointegration analysis (e.g. Lucey and Voronkova, 2004) . We construct a model-free yearly measure of correlation of returns from the daily data in the way reminiscent of constructing "realized volatility"daily measures from intraday 5-minute returns (see e.g. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Labys, 2003) , and track its evolution during the decade.
More precisely, we consider daily returns from two markets, 1 and 2, denoted r is computed as
where the bar denotes averaging over t running from (g 1)K + 1 to gK: We compute such measure over the running window with a step of one week (i.e. with g = 1+D=K; 1+2D=K; 1 + 3D=K; ; 2; 2 + D=K; ; G). non-resident investors. Apparently, the main reason for the high co-movements is …nancial linkages including direct trading by non-residents in the Russian stock market, although one cannot exclude mimicking behavior on the part of market participants (Masson, 1999) . …gures may be taken as a relative variance of the "common factor"in the Russian and world stock returns. It is also worth noting that the presence of this "common factor"diminished during the last three years.
Four other sectors are represented in the Russian index, with the energy sector dominant.
Interestingly, the energy correlations seem quite similar to the three others. Indeed, during the 1998 pre-crisis and crisis periods, the energy correlation was around 0.3, matching the IT correlation, while the materials, capital goods and telecom correlations reached nearly 0.5. Hence, the crisis-related spillover e¤ects may be grasped in a larger degree by sectors other than the sector dominating the market emitting these spillovers. The ups and downs in the correlations in Figure 9 after the Russian crisis do not necessarily tend to be accordant.
In fact, the correlation between these …gures during 2000-2004 vary from 0:45 (between energy and telecom correlations) to 0:93 (between capital goods and IT correlations).
Even though most in ‡uential Russian stocks represent the energy extraction sector, the evidence here and in previous chapters is at variance with a common perception that the oil price must be a dominating factor in stock price formation. This is also con…rmed by the 
E¢ ciency of Russian stock market
The existing literature documents a signi…cant amount of predictability and (weak form) ine¢ ciency in stock markets in post-communist countries, Russia in particular, at the end of 20th century (see Zalewska-Mitura and Hall, 1999; Rockinger and Urga, 2000) . At the same time, one can observe a movement toward e¢ ciency in some of these markets (Rockinger and Urga, 2000) . In this section, we investigate by formal nonparametric methods if such movement indeed occured during that period and whether it continued into the new century.
We test the hypotheses that the weekly series of Russian stock returns has been mean non-predictable from the observable past during the decade under consideration. The excess pro…tability (EP) test of Anatolyev and Gerko (2005) allows one to test the property of conditional mean independence
i.e. that the conditional mean of the series of returns r t is impossible to predict using past information. Here, conditioning is on observable information available when investment decisions are made. Letr t be a continuously distributed forecast of r t using information at t 1. The one-shot EP test statistic has the following forms:
Everywhere, summation goes from 1 to T: As T ! 1; under the null of conditional mean
If the hypothesis E t 1 [r t ] = const is violated and there are no transaction costs or other market limitations, it is possible to extract pro…ts from judiciously investing in this market and the market is (weak form) ine¢ cient. Below, we adapt the hypothesis and test by performing sequential testing a great number of times in a moving window and computing the revenues of a virtual investor using a simple trading strategy. The trading strategy at the heart of the EP test issues a buy signal when the forecast for next period return is positive (and a sell signal, otherwise):
buy shares worth current wealth, ifr t 0; sell shares worth current wealth, otherwise.
Thus, our virtual investor goes long when the prediction for the next period return is positive (and short, otherwise). Equipped with this trading strategy, the investor modi…es her position each trading period closing it at the end of the period (see Gençay, 1998; Anatolyev and Gerko, 2005) . Note that the EP statistic can be interpreted as a normalized return of the position implied by the trading strategy described above (for details, see Anatolyev and Gerko, 2005) . We adapt the EP test to the retrospective situation (a brief description of the testing algorithm is contained in the Appendix). If the value of the EP statistic exceeds a critical value at least for one window position, the hypothesis of mean non-predictability during the entire trading period is rejected. If the hypothesis is rejected, the periods of ine¢ ciency may be identi…ed as those window positions when the EP values exceeded the critical value threshold.
There is a choice to be made for the predictorr t : Intuitively, the more powerful this predictor, the higher the pro…ts that may be obtained using the trading mechanism, and thus the higher the predictive power of the EP test. As the linear parametric model of Section 3 showed great explanatory power, at least during some periods, we try various predictors obtained using the same regressors available for the full period, i.e. ln(oil 1 ); ln(er 1 ); ln(msci us 1 ); tbill 1 , as well as lagged index growth (the variable risk 1 is not included as it available from the ex post analysis). Note that the global variables here are taken with weekly lags, too, because the decision variables should be known at the time when the investment decisions are made. We choose that combination of regressors for which the cumulative return from the trading strategy at the end of the decade is highest.
In this sense, it turns out that the "best" predictor is formed by regression on a constant, ln(oil 1 ); ln(msci us 1 ); and tbill 1 . At each point the predictor is computed using regression coe¢ cients estimated from the weekly data corresponding to a year before that point, and, of course, using only past data already available at that point. Hence, the virtual trading process starts one year after the beginning of the decade, i.e. in January 1996.
Figure 10 presents graphs of evolution of cumulative logarithmic returns of the buy-andhold strategy (i.e. investing the entire wealth and closing the position in 2005), and the trading strategy described above. In monetary terms, the log-return from the buy-and-hold strategy equals 1.9432, corresponding to the return of 698% over nine years. The log-return from the trading strategy equals 2.7674, corresponding to the return of 1,592% over nine years. The positive return is predicted 303 times, while the negative return is predicted 171 times. The ideal pro…t measure, i.e. the cumulative log-return of the trading strategy over that of the perfect foresight predictor (Gençay, 1998) equals approximately 10% at the end, and reaches a maximum of 38% in mid-1997. It is clear from Figure 9 that, up to early 1998, the forecasts are so poor that even costless trading would have resulted in a return equal or lower than a buy-and-hold approach. However, just before and during the 1998 Russian …nancial crisis, it was pretty easy to forecast negative drops and achieve high returns by applying the trading mechanism. This changed in the early 1999 when losses from trading had o¤set a large portion of the gains obtained. Some of these losses were compensated by appreciable gains at the end of 2000, but starting from that point, the trading process on average brings losses. The virtual investor would have done better to withdrawn her funds and close the position at that point, although she also ends the period with a positive surplus over the investor using a buy-and-hold strategy.
Of course, the described trading is merely a thought experiment. In practice, one would not be able to implement it for a number of reasons, including restrictions on short selling in the Russian market, signi…cant transaction costs, and the lack of an MSCI index investment product. Yet, even in a costless and frictionless trading environment, a virtual investor would not be particularly successful in extracting large pro…ts. This is con…rmed by the evolution of the EP statistic depicted in Figure 11 . For no position of a rolling window did the EP statistic exceeded even the one-sided 5% critical value (shown by the dotted line). Although there are numerous ups and downs in the value of the EP statistic, its path is consistent with the behavior of increments of Brownian motion. In conclusion, we can augment the …ndings of Rockinger and Urga (2000) with a …nding that the e¢ ciency in the Russian stock market, once established, has persisted throughout the beginning of the new century.
Conclusion
The results reported in this paper provide overwhelming evidence of structural instability in the Russian stock market and that the instability was not con…ned to …nancial crises. In recent years, the in ‡uence of oil prices and foreign exchange rates on Russian stock returns has diminished, while the in ‡uence of US stock prices and US and Russian interest rates has increased. The in ‡uence of monetary aggregates such as gold reserves and credit balances, once non-trivial, has recently fallen to practically zero. In total, the explanatory power of available domestic and global factors has ‡uctuated appreciably, with the value of regression 
